APPRAISING THE U.S. SUPREME COURT’S
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ABSTRACT

This Article assesses the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) after the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Germany v. Philipp. Philipp’s rejection of a genocide exception for a foreign state’s act of property expropriation comports with the absence of such an exception in the FSIA’s text. The Article also suggests that the genocide exception as it had been developing was a detrimental development in FSIA interpretation and was also harmful to international human rights law, inasmuch as it distorted the concept of genocide. The Philipp Court’s renewed focus on the international law of property, rather than of human rights, should not harm victims of expropriation who have availed themselves of the genocide exception in past years because discriminatory takings violate international property law. Similarly, in Philipp, the Supreme Court framed the issue as one of domestic takings, concluding that such takings cannot come within an exception to foreign sovereign immunity. But, at the same time, the Court did not reject prior case law, which holds that a taking is not domestic in nature if made by a sovereign against its own vulnerable minorities if it did not treat them as full citizens at the time of the property expropriation. Thus, the same sorts of victims who were recovering under the recent FSIA genocide exception (and had been recovering before the FSIA genocide exception was created) should be able to continue to have their cases heard under the FSIA. This Article also considers recent international law developments, which maintain that international law is concerned with how states treat their own citizens, suggesting that the FSIA’s domestic versus alien expropriation test, not textually based in the statute, may be ripe for reconsideration to eliminate the distinction. While such an approach for FSIA’s property expropriation section would not contradict the statute’s text, it would contravene precedential authority and not be endorsed under Philipp’s reasoning.

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Key words: *Germany v. Philipp*; Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act; property expropriation; genocide exception; domestic takings; international law.
INTRODUCTION

With its recent decision in *Federal Republic of Germany v. Philipp*, the United States Supreme Court put an end to a case law evolution that had been developing over the past several years in certain federal courts of appeal, including the D.C. Court of Appeals. The federal appellate courts in question had adopted an exception to foreign sovereign immunity for property expropriations that occurred in the context of genocide. The text of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) does not enumerate a genocide exception within its list of exceptions to immunity from jurisdiction, however.

The problems with this evolution in the law of the FSIA were both from the standpoint of the FSIA and from the law of genocide. The FSIA is a comprehensive statute—to be interpreted based on its text. As Congress stated when enacting it, and as the Supreme Court has expressly held on more than one occasion, “The key word . . . is *comprehensive*”; “any sort of immunity defense made by a foreign sovereign in an American court must stand on the Act’s text. Or it must fall.”

The courts that interpreted FSIA’s property expropriation exception to include a genocide exception were not just creating new meaning in the text of the FSIA; they also were creating case law precedent that redefined and weakened the concept of genocide at a time when the politicization of the term was becoming increasingly problematic. Moreover, victims of genocide previously had been able to obtain satisfaction under a separate evolution of FSIA case law that involved an interpretation of the statute directly involving the expropriation of property by
foreign sovereigns of non-nationals. Thus, plaintiffs did not need the genocide exception from a practical perspective.

Philipp, on the whole, represents a salutary redirection of the law, although it fails to adopt the position international law has increasingly been espousing—that international law today is concerned with how other states treat their nationals. The Supreme Court’s rejection of that interpretation of the FSIA property expropriation exception is consistent with past case law and, as it explained, much international law and U.S. legal tradition.

I. THE FSIA’S PROPERTY EXPROPRIATION EXCEPTION

A. Jus Cogens in an Early Case and Reprised in Philipp

The statute’s property expropriation exception, Section 1605(a)(3), reads in relevant part as follows: “(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States in any case . . . (3) in which rights in property taken in violation of international law are in issue . . . .” The challenge for genocide victims has been that the FSIA does not allow for non-commercial tort recovery for such violations if they are committed outside of the United States. Therefore, plaintiffs have had to sue under Section 1605(a)(3) for claims over the property stolen from them as part of the genocidal projects.

Courts, however, dismissed the early cases for lawsuits brought under Section 1605(a)(3). For example, in Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, Hugo Princz, a man who had at all relevant times been a U.S. citizen, but who had lived in Slovakia during the Second World War, was arrested and deported to Nazi concentration camps where he underwent inhumane physical abuse, and his family perished under agonizing circumstances. Princz was unable to maintain an action against Germany for property expropriation connected with his deportation. The Second Circuit’s
majority, in a reversal of the lower court, noted in particular that the commission of a *jus cogens* violation “does not confer jurisdiction under the FSIA.”\(^{15}\) The court reasoned that Princz had failed to establish any of Section 1605’s exceptions to immunity and rejected the plaintiff’s argument that fundamental human rights violations could be equated with an implicit waiver of immunity.\(^ {16}\)

The *Princz* case was controversial because the plaintiff had always been a U.S. citizen, even at the time of the alleged violations. Furthermore, this decision left him entirely without a remedy precisely because, as a U.S. citizen, he was not eligible for post-war German restitution, which he otherwise would have been able to obtain as a European Nazi victim.\(^ {17}\) Ever since this case, plaintiffs less frequently invoke the waiver of immunity exception. And, as explained by the *Restatement (Fourth) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States*, in keeping with the rationale of *Princz*, it is problematic for plaintiffs because the legal concept of waiver requires a voluntary act on the part of the defendant.\(^ {18}\)

With *Philipp*, the Supreme Court echoed *Princz*’s understanding of *jus cogens* as not being a sufficient, independent basis for Section 1605 FSIA jurisdiction.\(^ {19}\) The *Philipp* case involved valuable art that had belonged to German Jewish owners during the Nazi period until Hitler’s Reich Marshal Goering decided he wanted to own it personally.\(^ {20}\) The plaintiffs alleged in the case that the owners then were forced to sell at a coerced price after Goering’s representatives threatened them.\(^ {21}\) In *Philipp*, the Supreme Court reasoned that the plaintiffs were misguided in arguing that section 1605’s phrase “in violation of international law” includes genocide, which was the basis of the plaintiffs’ Section 1605 exception claim.\(^ {22}\) This is because, in the opinion of the Supreme Court—the international law referenced in the FSIA section at issue in cases of property expropriation is the international law of *property* (presumably the customary international law of property)—not an

\(^ {15}\) *Id.* at 1174.

\(^ {16}\) *Id.*

\(^ {17}\) *See id.* at 1176–85.


\(^ {19}\) *See Federal Republic of Germany v. Philipp*, 141 S. Ct. 703 (2021).

\(^ {20}\) *Id.* at 708.

\(^ {21}\) *Id.*

\(^ {22}\) For how the taking of property came to be a basis for claiming genocide, see infra, Section III.
expanded law of international customary law that encompasses all international human rights. 23

Section I.B below starts with a case in which the foreign sovereign was deemed to have waived its immunity in the context of jus cogens violations, unlike in Princz. Yet it nevertheless resulted in a dismissal of most of the case when the court applied what is known as the domestic takings exception to bar most of the plaintiffs’ claims. 24

B. Domestic Takings and the Relevant Nationality Test

In Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, the U.S. district court deemed Argentina to have waived its sovereign immunity where it had asked the U.S. courts to assist it in criminally prosecuting the Sidermans as part of Argentina’s discriminatory persecution of the family based on their Jewish heritage. 25 That, however, was not the end of the story. Under international law in general, states traditionally do not interfere with what other sovereigns do to their own nationals. Therefore, the courts of the United States have adopted a domestic takings exception that reinstates immunity where a sovereign’s property expropriation is committed against its own national. 26 This principle of non-interference derives from international comity 27 and has been noted with approval in The Restatement (Fourth). 28 In Siderman, the Ninth Circuit held that only the family’s daughter’s claims could survive because she was a U.S. citizen. In her case, Argentina had dispossessed a non-Argentinian in violation of Section 1605. The court dismissed the parents’ claims because, being Argentinian, they fell within the domestic takings exception. 29

23 Philipp, 141 S. Ct. at 715.
24 Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992).
25 Id. at 704.
29 Siderman, 965 F.2d at 711–13.
1. Germany

In the years since Siderman,\(^{30}\) and perhaps particularly since Princz, however, the courts have developed a test for nationality under the FSIA property expropriation exception that Philipp endorsed. This test had become established in FSIA case law well before plaintiffs argued, and in some circuits obtained, the now-overturned genocide exception. I have called it elsewhere the “substantive citizenship rights”\(^{31}\) standard, to contrast with a nominal or formal citizenship test. It began in FSIA cases when the Ninth Circuit decided in Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain that German Jews living in Nazi Germany in 1939—although not having citizenship in any other country—were exempt from being deemed German for the purpose of the FSIA’s domestic takings exception.\(^{32}\) Cassirer concerned the plaintiff’s grandmother, a German Jew who had to undergo a forced sale of her property at a ludicrously low amount in order to be permitted to leave Nazi Germany.\(^{33}\) The Ninth Circuit rejected Germany’s argument that this constituted a “domestic taking” and that it was immune from jurisdiction under the FSIA.\(^{34}\) Rather, the court said that the plaintiff’s grandmother, although nominally German, had been deprived by the defendant’s predecessor state of the fundamental rights that characterize citizenship: “a citizen is one who has the right to exercise all the political and civil privileges extended by his government . . . Citizenship conveys the idea of membership in a nation . . . .”\(^{35}\)

2. Hungary

In de Csepel v. Republic of Hungary,\(^{36}\) the lower court found, and the appellate court agreed, that Jews in Hungary dispossessed of property during the Second World War also did not fall within the domestic takings exception. The district court evoked the plaintiff’s evidence that:

As of 1944, Hungarian Jews could not acquire citizenship by means of naturalization, marriage, or legalization; vote or be elected to public office; be

\(^{30}\) It is not clear Siderman would have come out differently under the substantive citizenship test. It is true that Jews were a particular target of persecution at the time known as Argentina’s “dirty war,” see generally Federico Finchelstein, The Ideological Origins of the Dirty War: Fascism, Populism, and Dictatorship in Twentieth Century Argentina 52–64 (2014) but given how viciously others were persecuted at the time for their political views, Siderman may not be in contrast to the substantive citizenship rights test. For an excellent portrayal of the dirty war by a Jewish leftist newspaper publisher, see Jacobo Timerman, Prisoner Without a Name, Cell Without a Number (Tony Talbot trans., 1981).

\(^{31}\) See Curran, supra note 26, at 60.
employed as civil servants, state employees, or schoolteachers; enter into enforceable contracts; participate in various industries and professions; participate in paramilitary youth training or serve in the armed forces; own property; or acquire title to land or other immovable property. Moreover, all Hungarian Jews over the age of six were required to wear distinctive signs identifying themselves as Jewish, and were ultimately subject to complete forfeiture of all assets, forced labor inside and outside Hungary, and ultimately genocide.\(^{37}\)

Perhaps most notably, where Hungary objected that the plaintiff herself had maintained that she was a Hungarian citizen, the court emphasized that whether or not she “still considered herself to be a Hungarian citizen in 1944, it is clear that . . . the government of Hungary thought otherwise and had *de facto* stripped her . . . and all Hungarian Jews of their citizenship rights.”\(^{38}\)

Both Germany and Hungary had passed antisemitic statutes,\(^{39}\) so the court’s conclusion could have rested on a *de jure* basis, but it did not. It is to be emphasized that the substantive citizenship test is a *de facto* test, as the court explicitly stated in

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32 Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, 616 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2010).
33 *Id.* at 1023.
34 *Id.*
35 *Id.* (emphasis added). The Nazi government’s Nuremberg laws of 1935 had relegated Jews to second-class citizenship, depriving them of such rights. Nazi Germany made clear that it did not consider Jews to be part of the German nation in terms of *Volk*, an ethnic perspective of nationhood, based on what it called blood and race (“Blut und Rasse”). See Bryan Mark Rigg, *Nuremberg Laws, in 15 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA* 348, 348–50 (2d ed. 2007).
37 *Id.* at 129 (internal references omitted).
38 *Id.* at 130.
The de jure aspect of antisemitic legislation is potent and no doubt conclusive; thus, there is sufficient evidence for establishing the stripping of the essential rights of full citizenship. But the courts’ analysis in both Cassirer and de Csepel make clear that de jure deprivation of rights is not necessary to disqualify a taking from being deemed domestic where evidence exists that the defendant state stripped the plaintiff of the full rights of citizenship de facto.

3. Philipp’s Endorsement of the Substantive Citizenship Test

The Supreme Court held as follows in Philipp: “[T]he phrase ‘rights in property taken in violation of international law,’ as used in the FSIA’s expropriation exception, refers to violations of the international law of expropriation and thereby incorporates the domestic takings rule.” In the last sentence of the decision, it also acknowledged that plaintiffs do not fall within the domestic takings ban if they can meet the substantive citizenship requirement:

Nor do we consider an alternative argument noted by the heirs: that the sale of the Welfenschatz is not subject to the domestic takings rule because the consortium members were not German nationals at the time of the transaction. The Court of Appeals should direct the District Court to consider this argument, including whether it was adequately preserved below.

The problem for the Philipp plaintiffs was that, in the words of the Supreme Court, they had not based their argument on Germany’s failure to come within the domestic takings exception. Instead, “[t]he heirs responded that the exception did apply because Germany’s purchase of the Welfenschatz was an act of genocide and the taking therefore violated the international law of genocide”; and “contend that their claims fall within the exception for ‘property taken in violation of international law,’ Section 1605(a)(3), because the coerced sale of the Welfenschatz, their

40 de Csepel, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 130.
41 Philipp, 141 S. Ct. at 715.
42 Id. at 715–16 (internal citations omitted). At oral argument, justices repeatedly asked the plaintiff’s attorneys who argued the genocide exception if their clients really should be considered to have been nationals of the defendant states at the time of the takings. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, Philipp, 141 S. Ct. 703 (No. 19-351), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2020/19-351_d0fi.pdf [https://perma.cc/7UEZ-GZUT].
43 Id. at 709.
property, constituted an act of genocide, and genocide is a violation of international human rights law."\(^{44}\) Plaintiffs’ argument to the Supreme Court summarized the D.C. Circuit’s holding, along with the Seventh Circuit’s, that the very taking of property, no matter how minimal, could be equated with genocide and that, in direct contradiction to the holding in *Princz*, the FSIA denies sovereign immunity for genocide.\(^{45}\) The next section explains how such an unlikely development emerged.

II. GENOCIDE AND THE FSIA

A. The FSIA Genocide Cases

The genocide exception to the FSIA, which was entirely court-created, displaced the domestic takings test where plaintiffs argued that property expropriation occurred in the context of genocide. In *Abelesz v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank*,\(^ {46}\) later reheard as *Fischer v. Magyar Allamvasutak Zrt.*,\(^ {47}\) the Seventh Circuit held that the domestic takings standard was inapplicable where property expropriation was “an integral part[] of [an] overall genocidal plan.”\(^{48}\) In *Abelesz-Fischer*, the plaintiffs were Hungarian Jews whose last belongings were stolen at the train station prior to deportation to concentration camps; thus, the smallest last remaining possession of an already impoverished person would qualify as genocide.\(^ {49}\) In such cases, the court did make clear that the taking needed to be an integral part of the overall genocide, such that the property expropriation that displaced the domestic takings exception test was not to be isolated from the plan of genocide.\(^ {50}\)

Subsequently, relying on *Abelesz*, a California district court specified that, even where a plaintiff was a full citizen of the defendant state, a taking in the context of genocide would warrant FSIA jurisdiction because of the inapplicability of the domestic takings exception.\(^ {51}\) This particular case involved property expropriation

\(^{44}\) Id.

\(^{45}\) See id.

\(^{46}\) *Abelesz*, 692 F.3d at 675.

\(^{47}\) Fischer v. Magyar Allamvasutak Zrt., 777 F.3d 847 (7th Cir. 2016).

\(^{48}\) *Abelesz*, 692 F.3d at 675.

\(^{49}\) Id.

\(^{50}\) Id. at 676.

\(^{51}\) *Davoyan*, 116 F. Supp. 3d at 1102.
of ethnic Armenians by Turkey during the Armenian genocide. The court held that the Armenians were full citizens of Turkey—however implausible it may be that the de facto Cassirer and de Csepel substantive citizenship test can support the conclusion that people targeted for expropriation and death because of belonging to a minority population could have been full-fledged citizens of the expropriating defendant sovereign state.52

The D.C. Circuit in Philipp echoed Abelesz-Fischer in dispensing with the domestic takings exception where “the takings of property . . . bear a sufficient connection to genocide that they amount to takings ‘in violation of international law.’”53 But the court then proceeded to exceed even the holding of the Seventh Circuit by stating that, “in such situations, the expropriations themselves constitute genocide.”54

The idea that expropriations in and of themselves are genocide was expressed very clearly by the appellate court in Simon v. Republic of Hungary,55 the companion case to Philipp in the Supreme Court.56 The facts of Simon were virtually identical to those of Abelesz, also involving the expropriation of the last possessions of Hungarian Jews as they were being deported on trains to concentration camps.57 The court stated that the act of property dispossession, without regard to value, or anything else, was itself genocide: “we see the expropriations as themselves genocide.”58

1. The Law of Genocide

Raphael Lemkin, the author of Axis Rule in Occupied Europe,59 is the man who coined the term “genocide” after having lost almost all of his family to the Nazi

52 See supra Section I.B.
54 Id.
55 Simon, 812 F.3d at 142.
57 Simon, 812 F.3d. at 133–34.
58 Id. at 142.
genocide of Jews. He had been an occasional law professor, among others, at Yale and New York University after he emigrated to the United States but spent almost all of his time and energy trying to persuade the United Nations to pass a genocide convention. Michael Ignatieff, whose father was a Canadian diplomat at the UN at the time, told his son that Lemkin relentlessly pestered anyone he came across at the UN until he finally succeeded. In Philippe Sands’ book, East Street West Street: On the Origins of “Genocide” and “Crimes against Humanity,” about Lemkin and Lauterpacht, the two giants of twentieth century international human rights law who influenced the Nuremberg trials, Lemkin comes across in much the same way. In 1948, Lemkin’s work paid off. The UN passed The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. It defines genocide as follows: As part of an “intent to destroy . . . a national, ethnical, racial or religious group . . . (a) Killing members of the group; . . . (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction . . .” and similar acts calculated to annihilate the group.

The history of genocide has been a long and sordid one. Its latest twist has been its politicization and the inevitable trivialization of the concept that politicization entails. According to Ignatieff, the term “genocide” is now so banalized and misused that there is a serious risk that commemoration of his work will become an act of forgetting, obliterating what was so singular about his achievement. And “Lemkin would have been astonished and indignant at the afterlife of his word—how victim groups of all kinds have pressed it into service to validate their victimization, and how powerful states have eschewed the word lest it entrain an obligation to act.”

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61 See id.

62 Id.


65 Id. art. II.


67 Ignatieff, supra note 60.
In *East Street West Street*, Philippe Sands, writing his reflections as an international human rights lawyer, echoes this sobering perspective.\(^{68}\) They are not alone in decrying the politicization of international human rights.\(^{69}\)

When a court says that the taking of any property, however minimal, is itself genocide, such a judge is not performing a service to the victims of the Nazi genocide or, as in one California case, the victims of the Armenian genocide. I do not doubt for a moment that all of the FSIA judges in the district and appellate courts of the Seventh and D.C. Circuits, California, and other relevant district courts, were well-intentioned. However, such rulings do a disservice to the memory of those terrible genocides—and were unnecessary under pre-existing domestic takings law. As things now stand, the plaintiffs in *Philipp* may lose the compensation they merit if the lower court on remand finds that they failed to avail themselves of that argument.\(^{70}\)

The recent U.S. Supreme Court *Philipp* decision was unanimous.\(^{71}\) It has corrected the law of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act by eliminating a genocide exception that the FSIA does not have and does not warrant under the text and interpretive caselaw of the statute, and that demeans the meaning of genocide.

When the Court emphasized that it was shutting the door on general international human rights claims and restricting Section 1605 to violations of international law in the context of property law,\(^{72}\) it was not precluding the sort of property expropriation that typifies the claims of genocide victims. The FSIA’s legislative history characterizes Section 1605 property expropriation “in violation of international law” as follows: “The term ‘taken in violation of international law’ would include the nationalization or expropriation of property without payment of the prompt adequate and effective compensation required by international law. It would also include takings which are arbitrary or discriminatory in nature.”\(^{73}\)

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\(^{68}\) SANDS, supra note 63.


\(^{70}\) See *Philipp*, 141 S. Ct. 703 (2021).

\(^{71}\) See id.

\(^{72}\) Id. at 712.

\(^{73}\) H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 6616 (1976). The House Report contemplates the possible application of the Act of State doctrine: “Since, however, this section deals solely with issues of immunity, it in no way affects existing law on the extent to which, if at all, the ‘act of state’ doctrine may be applicable.” Id.
The Restatement (Fourth) § 455 similarly highlights the following characteristics which reflect customary international law on property expropriations: “the taking was not for a public purpose, or was discriminatory, or not accompanied by prompt, adequate, and effective compensation.”

After Philipp, the international law of illegal property takings does not include genocide. It does, however, include property expropriation, which targets minority populations in a discriminatory manner and does not involve prompt and adequate financial compensation.

A lingering critique of the Supreme Court decision concerns the domestic takings exception, and whether it would be warranted to move beyond that well-established doctrine to embrace current trends in international law. That is the subject of the following Section.

III. Modern International Law’s Evolution Beyond Citizenship Inquiries for Discriminatory Takings

A. The Philipp Court’s Affirmation of the Domestic Takings Rule.

The domestic takings exception is a well-settled doctrine, as the Supreme Court took pains to note in Philipp. But like the genocide exception, it does not appear in the text of the FSIA. The Court in recent years has shown a tendency towards unanimous decisions where some justices’ concerns about maintaining harmonious relations with other countries meet other concerns of different justices, such as stemming the tide of litigation. Philipp explains the Court’s objective of furthering U.S. policy to refrain from “producing friction in our relations with [other] nations and leading some [of them] to reciprocate by granting their courts permission to embroil the United States in expensive and difficult litigation.”

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74 Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relns. L. of the U.S. § 455 cmt. c (Am. L. Inst. 2015). See also id. n.4 (analyzing caselaw), and Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relns. L. of the U.S. § 712 (Am. L. Inst. 1987), both more detailed and specifying that it is a summary of customary international law.

75 Philipp, 141 S. Ct. at 710.


The Court then cited the pre-FSIA letter of Secretary of State Hull to the effect that Mexico was free to mistreat its own citizens as far as the United States was concerned—but not U.S. citizens. The Court presented it as part of the origins of the domestic takings position in the U.S.:

The domestic takings rule has deep roots not only in international law but also in United States foreign policy. Secretary of State Cordell Hull most famously expressed the principle in a 1938 letter to the Mexican Ambassador following that country’s nationalization of American oil fields. The Secretary conceded “the right of a foreign government to treat its own nationals in this fashion if it so desires. This is a matter of domestic concern.” . . . The United States, however, could not “accept the idea” that “these plans can be carried forward at the expense of our citizens.”

The Court also cited to Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino as an indication of U.S. congressional intent to distinguish between a foreign sovereign’s taking of its own citizens’ property and others’, inasmuch as the reaction to the case’s holding that the Court would not interfere with Cuba’s nationalization of U.S. citizens’ property in Cuba was met by subsequent legislation to require courts to grant such compensation for U.S. citizens. Moreover, in the context of foreign states’ confiscation of their own citizens’ property, the Philipp Court said that the principle that domestic takings were not a matter of international law concern was “beyond debate,” noting that numerous states which nationalized formerly private property as they adopted socialism vociferously argued for their sovereign right, not just to do so, but also to nationalize foreigners’ property. The Court did not note, however, that this stance largely has disappeared as developing states started to want to attract foreign investment to increase their prosperity.

78 Id. at 710 (citing Letter from Cordell Hull, U.S. Sec’y of State, to Castillo Nájera, Mexican Ambassador (July 21, 1938), reprinted in 5 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC PAPERS 677 (1956)) (internal citations omitted).
79 Id.
80 Id. at 711 (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 403 (1964)).
81 Id.
82 Id. at 710–11.
The takings distinction between a foreign sovereign’s expropriation of its own nationals’ property and its expropriation of the property of aliens, recognized by the Philipp Court, derives from an international law tenet that is becoming increasingly obsolete: that international law does not concern itself with how a state treats its own citizens.\(^84\) The Court anticipated this argument by stating that the “domestic takings rule endured even as a growing body of human rights law made states’ treatment of individual human beings a matter of international concern.”\(^85\) As international law norms continue to evolve, the issue is if the rule also should evolve and if the Section 1605(a)(3)’s property expropriation exception should deny immunity to a sovereign for any taking in violation of the customary international law of property—whether its own nationals’ property or the property of aliens.

1. Current International Law Norms

As the Court acknowledged in Philipp, modern international law came to recognize the individual as a subject, whereas previously, international law had been a law of states—without individuals having a direct role.\(^86\) This development, although with pre-World War II antecedents, predominantly was the consequence of the Second World War’s atrocities.\(^87\) The recognition that international law could and should no longer count on states to protect their own vulnerable minority populations, much less espouse their legal claims in international tribunals, has led to a reassessment of entrenched distinctions between nationals and aliens in numerous international law contexts.

One context is universal jurisdiction, “the authority of the State to punish certain crimes wherever and by whom committed,”\(^88\) regardless of nationality. While such universally recognized crimes tend to be the subject of jurisdiction-conferring treaties, they need not be since, by virtue of being universally recognized as

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\(^84\) Philipp, 141 S. Ct. at 706, 709–10.

\(^85\) Id. at 706.

\(^86\) See id. at 709–10.


\(^88\) Schachter, supra note 87, at 267.
violations of fundamental human rights, they are *erga omnes*. The Philipp Court has distanced Section 1605(a)(3) from this discussion by restricting it to property law. One need not depend on the law of crimes against humanity, however, to conclude that the FSIA’s property expropriation section should apply without regard to citizenship distinctions.

Modern international law has followed the path begun in international human rights since the Second World War by progressively erasing citizenship distinctions in international law. In international corporate law, it had long been held that a state could not espouse the claims of its citizens who held shares in a company that allegedly was harmed by another state where the company had citizenship other than that of the shareholders. In commenting on *Diallo*, a more recent case in which the International Court of Justice (ICJ) evoked the above *Barcelona Traction* principle, Brownlie commented as follows: “[T]he law has moved on. It is no longer the case that states do not bear international responsibility for injuries caused to their own nationals.” The injury at issue was precisely the sort of property expropriation that arises in Section 1605(a)(3) cases: it was an allegedly discriminatory taking of the individual’s property involving harm to his corporation that had been incorporated under the laws of the defendant state, the Democratic Republic of Congo.

As Brownlie tells us, international law has moved on, including specifically, the law of property expropriation. Had *Siderman* been decided under Brownlie’s criteria, the case would have proceeded on all claims despite the Siderman parents having been Argentinian. Similarly, the plaintiffs in *Philipp* would be able to have their case heard under these criteria. Restricting Section 1605’s property expropriation exception to takings in violation solely of the international law of

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89 *Id.* at 269 (referring to *RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELS. L. OF THE U.S.* § 702 (AM L. INST. 1987) and comments, and *id.* § 404, cmt. a).

90 *Barcelona Traction* (Belg. v. Spain), Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 5) (Belgium sued Spain on behalf of its shareholders but the International Court of Justice held that Belgium had no standing because the company harmed was Canadian.).


92 CRAWFORD, *supra* note 87, at 682 (emphasis added).

93 See *Diallo*, *supra* note 91, at 590.

94 CRAWFORD, *supra* note 87, at 682.
property does not mean that Section 1605 needs to be restricted to takings of alien property under current international law.

In Philipp, the Court referred to a “consistent practice of interpreting the FSIA ‘in keeping with international law at the time of the FSIA’s enactment’”\(^{95}\) in the context of the FSIA’s requirement that sovereign immunity could be lost only for the expropriation of the property of aliens, or those deemed aliens under the appropriate application of the domestic takings exception. It cited to only one case for this appraisal, *Permanent Mission of India to United Nations*,\(^{96}\) but that case involved diplomatic protection issues under the FSIA and concerned the ability of New York City to tax certain properties rented by lower-level employees of India’s Mission.\(^{97}\) The Court ruled against sovereign immunity in that case.\(^{98}\) However, these issues are far removed from the takings exception of Section 1605(a)(3) involved in *Philipp* and *Simon*. In *Permanent Mission*, the Court looked to the relevant international law at the time of the FSIA’s enactment without stating that it needed to do so.\(^{99}\) It appears that FSIA case law does not provide a consistent practice in this regard. Some courts have, on the contrary, explained what they thought to be international law at the time they were deciding Section 1605 FSIA cases, not at the time of the FSIA’s enactment. An example is *De Sanchez v. Banco Cent. de Nicaragua*,\(^{100}\) in which the court explored recent international law developments in deciding its FSIA case. The *Philipp* Court’s declaration of a consistent practice to the contrary is likely to weigh heavily on the future of this issue.

**IV. Conclusion**

With *Philipp*, the Supreme Court has rectified the recent interpretive mishap of courts that imputed a genocide exception to the FSIA where none existed and where its inclusion endangered the meaning of the concept of genocide. At the same time, the Court maintained the ability of minority victims of genocidal undertakings to


\(^{96}\) See id.

\(^{97}\) *Permanent Mission*, 551 U.S. at 195–96.

\(^{98}\) Id. at 195.

\(^{99}\) Id. at 201–02.

\(^{100}\) *De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua*, 770 F.2d 1385, 1396 (5th Cir. 1985). For some criticism of the court’s substantive reasoning on international law in that case, see Curran, *supra* note 26, at 55–56.
recover for property expropriations where they were not accorded the rights of citizenship by the expropriating state.

The Court also rejected the possibility of interpreting the international law provision of the FSIA in terms of contemporary international law standards. Several factors militate against the probability that U.S. courts will adopt Brownlie’s approach of making states responsible for how they treat their own citizens. The first is Philipp’s having asserted that there is a practice of interpreting international law as of the time of the FSIA’s enactment. The second is the Court’s general reluctance in recent years to violate the presumption against extraterritoriality.101 A third factor, related to the second, is the Court’s general deference to the Act of State Doctrine. The Court also correctly noted that, as it is, the United States stands as the only country in the world to have a provision like Section 1605 allowing for the abrogation of foreign sovereign immunity due to a foreign sovereign’s public acts of property expropriations.102

None of these factors is part of the text of the FSIA, however. Unlikely as it may seem in Philipp’s aftermath, their sway may ebb if, as time goes by, modern international law norms become more persuasive.

